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Abstract
The Mortensen-Pissarides model is an attractive model because it is
tractable, delivers some intuitive comparative statics and permits policy
analysis. However, Shimer (2005) shows that the model generates far too
little volatility in its key variables ￿ unemployment and vacancies ￿ rela-
tive to the variation in the shock variables. Shimer identi￿es the ￿exibility
of wages as the key issue. In this Comment, we show that it is possible
to generate suﬃcient volatility in unemployment and vacancies whilst re-
taining the standard wage determination process. We set out a model
with two important changes from the Mortensen-Pissarides approach: job
search by the employed is allowed, and the vacancy creation condition
is changed to allow churning of workers. Calibrating the model to UK
data, we show that our model can produce volatility in the unemploy-
ment and vacancy series to match the data; we con￿rm for the UK that
the Mortensen-Pissarides model cannot, as shown by Shimer for the US.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Mortensen-Pissarides model of the search and matching process is now
￿rmly established in the toolkit for analysing labour markets and the macro-
economy (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, 1999a). It is an attractive model
because it is tractable, delivers some intuitive comparative statics and permits
policy analysis. However, Shimer (2005) shows that in one major aspect the
standard model does not ￿t the facts. This is that the model generates far too
little volatility in its key variables ￿ unemployment and vacancies ￿ relative to
the variation in the shock variables. Shimer identi￿es the ￿exibility of wages as
the key issue1.
In this Comment, we show that it is possible to generate suﬃcient volatility in
unemployment and vacancies whilst retaining the standard wage determination
process. We set out a model2 with two important changes from the Mortensen-
Pissarides approach: job search by the employed is allowed3,a n dt h ev a c a n c y
creation condition is changed to allow ￿churning￿ of workers4.T h a t i s , ￿rms
may keep jobs open when workers leave either to retire or to take another job,
and ￿nd replacement workers. Both these features are quantitatively signi￿cant
in real labour markets. Calibrating the model to UK data, we show that our
model produces volatility in the unemployment and vacancy series to match the
data; we con￿rm for the UK that the Mortensen-Pissarides model cannot, as
1Hall (2003b) notes the same problem, and proposes a model of sectoral shocks to generate
suﬃcient volatility in unemployment and vacancies.
2We have developed this more fully elsewhere (Burgess and Turon, 2004).
3Pissarides (1994), Shimer (2003) and Eriksson and Gottfries (2002) also set up unem-
ployment models with on-the-job search but keep job destruction exogenous and do not allow
￿rms￿ churning.
4This is de￿ned and measured in Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000). It is essentially the
excess of worker ￿ows over job ￿ows. The re-￿l l i n go fj o b sl e f tb yo t h e rw o r k e r sy i e l d sw o r k e r
￿ows but no job ￿ows.
2s h o w nb yS h i m e rw i t hU Sd a t a .
Our model delivers a greater volatility of the V-U ratio for two reasons.
First, our vacancy creation condition leads to a more volatile labour market
tightness. Second, allowing for on-the-job search releases the tie between labour
market tightness and the V-U ratio (this is detailed below), thereby allowing
this ratio to be much more volatile than the tightness.
We assume the arrival rate of potential new vacancies to be ￿nite,d i ﬀering
from the standard model. These job ￿ideas￿ are created over a range of idio-
syncratic productivities. The state of the business cycle, embodied in the value
of the common component of productivity, together with the tightness of the
labour market, determine the threshold idiosyncratic productivity below which
it is not worthwhile for a ￿rm to turn this ￿idea￿ into a vacant job. In a boom,
three factors operate in our model to raise vacancies. First, as in the stan-
dard Mortensen-Pissarides (hereafter M-P) model, an increase in the aggregate
price raises the value of all jobs and so generates more vacancies. Second, in our
model with heterogeneous vacancy creation the threshold value of a viable ￿idea￿
declines in a boom. Thus more ￿ideas￿ are turned into jobs in a boom, increasing
vacancies further. The third factor is a limited vacancy chain. Retiring work-
ers leave open job slots, some of which ￿rms ￿nd it worthwhile to re-advertise.
Without employed job search, these vacancy chains are of maximum length one,
but still exceed the length of zero assumed in the M-P model. This creates yet
further vacancies in a boom. Thus, the assumption of heterogeneous vacancy
creation induces a greater increase in vacancies in a boom relative to the M-P
model both through the greater range of ￿ideas￿ turned into jobs, and through
3the creation of limited vacancy chains.
Once we also allow for employed job searchers, labour market tightness and
the unemployment-vacancy ratio are not equivalent. The standard model es-
sentially implies a link between the volatility of shocks and the volatility of
labour market tightness. The key point is that it is the restriction that only
the unemployed can search that forces the equivalence between tightness and
the unemployment-vacancy ratio. Once this is relaxed, this gives the system
another degree of freedom, and in this model that works to impart greater
volatility to the unemployment-vacancy ratio. This works as follows: the boom
raises labour market tightness as measured by the ratio of vacancies (V )t o
total job seekers (J). Total job seekers are the unemployed (U)p l u st h ee m -
ployed job searchers. We can write the labour market tightness, or V-J ratio
as (V/J) ≡ (V/U) ∗ (U/J). With endogenous employed job search, the ratio of
unemployed to all job seekers, the U-J ratio, is counter-cyclical, falling in booms
as more of the employed ￿n dj o bs e a r c hp r o ￿table and unemployment declines.
This is very clear in the data ￿ see Burgess (1993). Thus the rise in the V-J
ratio translates into a fall in the U-J ratio and hence a much larger rise in the
V-U ratio. Employed job search also accentuates the vacancy chain process,
further increasing volatility.
In the next section we set out our model, and summarise the standard M-P
approach. Section 3 brie￿y introduces the UK data on unemployment, vacancies
and productivity shocks. We con￿rm the spirit of Shimer￿s ￿nding for UK data:
the standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio relative to trend is
approximately 28 times that of productivity relative to its trend. We calibrate
4three models to UK data: the standard MP model; a model with heterogeneous
vacancy creation but no on-the job search (Model I); and a model with het-
erogeneous vacancies and on-the-job search added (Model II). This isolates the
impact of each of our two key assumptions on the volatilities of interest here.
We show that the implied elasticity of the V-U ratio is around 1 in the M-P
model, 4.0 in Model I, and 12.2 in Model II, with both our vacancy creation
rule and employed job search. Our data yield an elasticity of 12.4. Section 4
concludes.
2 Models of Search and Matching
Our model builds on the standard M-P framework5, but diﬀers from it with
respect to job search and job creation; it is developed in greater detail in Burgess
and Turon (2004). First, we incorporate on-the-job search, with an endogenous
fraction of the employed ￿nding it worthwhile to search. Second, we allow for
heterogeneous vacancy creation and a ￿nite (rather than in￿nite) supply rate of
potential new jobs per period. We do this for the following reasons. We want to
allow some of the jobs quit from to be re-advertised rather than destroyed6.I fa l l
new vacancies were created at the highest idiosyncratic productivity, it would
never be optimal to re-advertise an on-going job with a lower productivity.
Therefore we assume heterogeneous vacancy creation. We also assume a ￿nite
supply of potential jobs, as in the presence of an in￿nite supply of potential
jobs ("ideas") per period, ￿rms would reject all but the highest idiosyncratic
productivity ideas and again there would be no re-advertisement. Given these
5See Pissarides (2000) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a) for the derivation of the original
model.
6In the standard set-up, total separations equal total job destruction.
5assumptions, ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to maintain and re-advertise an endogenous
fraction of jobs that workers quit from.
Potential new ￿ideas￿ for jobs are born at a ￿nite rate of jcr per period and
their value is distributed over the range (−σ;σ) according to a cumulative dis-
tribution function F( ). The value of the output produced by ￿r m si sc o m p o s e d
of two parts: the aggregate component, p and the idiosyncratic value of the
idea,  .W h e n  is above an endogenous threshold T it is worthwhile opening a
vacancy. The value of   is subject to idiosyncratic shocks occurring at rate λ,
anticipated by both workers and ￿rms. The post-shock distribution of   is also
F( ). If the post-shock idiosyncratic productivity falls below an endogenous
threshold R, the job is destroyed and the worker becomes unemployed; we show
that R<T. If the idiosyncratic productivity is below an endogenous threshold
S,w o r k e r s￿nd it worthwhile to search on the job. Whether a worker searches
on the job or not only depends on the idiosyncratic productivity of the job,  .
Following Jovanovic (1979), we assume that the job match is an experience
good, so the idiosyncratic productivity is unknown to the worker at the time of
the match and is only discovered once she takes the job. It is not possible for
￿rms advertising vacant jobs with a high productivity to signal it to job seekers
because they cannot commit to the promised wage once the worker is employed
(because of wage renegotiation). Because   is unknown ex ante,e m p l o y e dj o b
seekers sample all the available vacancies, and accept all oﬀers rather than
just those better than their current match. Therefore, neither the matching
probability nor the expected value of employment in the next job depend on the
value of   in their current job.
62.1 Bellman equations
We denote labour market tightness by θ, and an unemployed searcher￿s match-
ing probability as θq(θ). We assume that employed job seekers have a match-
ing probability equal to a times the matching probability of unemployed job
searchers. The per-period cost of employed job search is denoted k. We include
a constant probability of leaving the labour force, from employment, and enter-
ing the labour force, through unemployment, denoted l. The Bellman equations
for employed and unemployed workers are as follows (Eo ( ) denotes employed
workers searching on the job, En ( ) non-searching employed workers and U
unemployed workers):















rU = b + θq(θ)
￿Z σ
T
E(x)dFV (x) − U
¶
(2)
where i = o,n when   is in the range (R;S) or (S;T) respectively and Io equals
1 if the worker searches, i.e. if   is in the range (R;S) and 0 otherwise. r is
the discount rate, b is the per-period sum of the unemployment bene￿ta n dt h e
value of leisure, net of job search costs.
The Bellman equations for ￿lled jobs, Jo ( ) (Jn ( ) respectively) when the
7worker is (respectively is not) searching on the job, are:




J(x)dF(x) − Ji ( )
‚
+Io • [aθq (θ)(Vo ( ) − Jo ( ))]
For values of   in the interval (T;S),t h e￿rm expects the job to become vacant
again with probability aθq (θ) (the matching probability for employed workers).
It also expects the worker to leave the labour force with probability l7. When the
job becomes vacant it keeps its level of idiosyncratic productivity  , because this
de￿nes the job and is not attached to the worker or the worker-job match. The
wage negotiated with a worker continuing job search, wo ( ), will be diﬀerent
from the wage negotiated with a worker who stops searching, wn ( ) (see section
2.2). Since we assume that   is unobserved to the worker until the match actually
takes place and that no signalling can take place, all vacant jobs have the same
probability of being matched, irrespective of their idiosyncratic productivity  .
The Bellman equations for vacant jobs are:
rVi ( )=−c + q(θ)(Ji ( ) − Vi ( )) + λ
•Z σ
T
V (x).dF(x) − Vi ( )
‚
where c is the per-period cost of opening a vacancy.
Note that the distribution of idiosyncratic productivities   in vacant jobs,
FV (.),i sd i ﬀerent from the distribution of   following an idiosyncratic shock,
F(.). Reasons for this are detailed below and the derivation of the density
7Note that in case of retirement or quit to another job, the ￿rm plans to re-advertise the
job. So separations and job destruction are diﬀerent and labour force exits are not a form of
exogenous job destruction: most jobs left by a retiree are re-advertised.
8f u n c t i o n si sg i v e ni nB u r g e s sa n dT u r o n( 2 0 0 4 ) 8. Filled jobs with idiosyncratic
productivities in the range (T;S) are quit from and re-advertised at a rate
(l + aθq (θ)) whereas ￿lled jobs with idiosyncratic productivities in the range
(S;σ) are quit from and re-advertised at a rate l; ￿lled jobs with   in the range
(R;T) are quit from at rate (l + aθq (θ)) but once quit from are destroyed.
Vacant jobs are all matched at the same rate, q(θ). The distribution of idio-
syncratic productivity   will hence be diﬀerent between vacant jobs FV (.) and
￿lled jobs FE(.). Although the job-to-job quit rate and the retirement rate are
of similar magnitude on average, the retirement rate l is much lower than the
quit rate aθq(θ) for a given idiosyncratic productivity (by a factor 30 in our
base calibration). This is because workers retire from the whole employment
stock whereas they quit from only a small fraction of it (6% in our base cali-
bration). So the distribution of   in vacant jobs FV (.) is highly concentrated
in the interval (T;S) compared to the distribution of ￿lled jobs FE(.).I n o u r
base calibration, about half the vacancy stock is in this range against 6% of the
employment stock.
2.2 Surplus and wage bargaining
The wage is negotiated at the time of matching and is re-negotiated after idio-
syncratic shocks. The ￿rm knows that the worker will search if the idiosyn-
cratic productivity is below S, and this in￿uences the wage setting process.
The wage rate is determined by Nash bargaining between worker and ￿rm, as
in the Mortensen-Pissarides framework9. However, in their framework all new
8The fact that the model implies these three diﬀerent distributions instead of just one in
the standard setting prevents us from having a simple closed form solution to our model.
9There has been a growing literature on alternative models of wage determination over
the past decade, particularly models with wage-posting games (see Mortensen and Pissarides
9matches are formed at the maximum idiosyncratic productivity, leading to a
single wage rate at the match. In our setup, new matches occur over a range of
idiosyncratic productivities, namely (T;σ). The idiosyncratic productivity of a
job,  , is unknown to the worker at the time of the match, and is only revealed
when she starts in the job. Before the match actually occurs, there is no wage
oﬀer apart from a knowledge of the renegotiation rule. The worker always ￿nds
it worthwhile to take up the job oﬀer: for unemployed searchers because Eo(T)
is greater than U, and for employed job seekers because necessarily the expected
value of alternative employment net of search costs is greater than the value of
her current employment (otherwise she would not search). It may be that the
employed job seeker is unlucky when she ￿nds a new job in that she experiences
aw a g ed r o p 10,b u th e rexpected returns to search were still positive ex ante.
From the equations above, we see that the surplus from a match between a
vacant job and a job seeker will have a diﬀerent expression for jobs in which the
worker carries on searching and in jobs where the worker stops searching:
Si ( )=Ji ( ) − Vi ( )+Ei ( ) − U (4)
Because wage negotiation occurs once the worker is in the job, we assume that
the worker￿s outside option is unemployment in both cases. It is never optimal
for a ￿rm to attempt to retain a worker with an outside oﬀer by making a
counter-oﬀer. The potential outside oﬀer hence never becomes a new outside
option for the worker in the wage bargaining process as it would in Postel-Vinay
(1999b) for a survey). Here, wage dispersion is obtained with Nash bargaining wage determi-
nation.
10Nickell (2002, Table 7, p.21) reports that over 10% of job movers with no intervening
spell of unemployment experience a wage drop of over 10 % ,w i t hd a t ao nB r i t i s hm e no v e r
the period 1982-1996.
10and Robin (2002). A worker who has quit her previous job does not have the
option to go back to it, hence employed and unemployed job seekers are oﬀered
the same wage rates when hired. Pissarides (1994, p.465) and Shimer (2004,
p.5) make the same assumption, based on the impossibility of returning to the
old employer for a worker who quits a job and on the impossibility to commit
to a long-term contract to attract an employed worker for the prospective ￿rm.
The two wage rates wo( ) and wn ( ) resulting from the Nash bargaining
will satisfy the following conditions:
β (Ji ( ) − Vi ( )) = (1 − β)(Ei ( ) − U)
where β is the worker￿s share of the surplus11.
In jobs with low idiosyncratic productivity, there are expected bene￿ts to
job search for the worker as the expected value of a future job is high enough
compared to the value of the current job to more than oﬀset the search costs k.
For the ￿rm, employed job search represents a cost as it expects to have to re-
advertise the vacancy in the near future, and the value of a vacant job is always
lower than the value of the ￿lled job for the same productivity. These two facts
imply that the wage rate for workers engaged in on-the-job search, wo( ),i s
lower than the wage rate they would get if they were not searching, wn ( ),o v e r
the range of productivities where workers do decide to search on-the-job, (T;S).
Firms with idiosyncratic productivities in the range (T;S) are aware that
11Shimer (2004) shows that, in his model of on-the-job search, surplus sharing is not gen-
erally equivalent to the Nash solution. In our setting, however, because we assume   to be
unobserved before an oﬀer is accepted, neither the quit rate nor the expected value of em-
ployment in the next job for employed job seekers depend on the level of their current wage.
It follows that, for employed job seekers, raising wo by ∆wo will increase the worker￿s side of
the surplus by [r + l + aθq(θ)+λ].∆wo and lower the ￿rm￿s side of the surplus by the same
amount. The Nash solution will hence coincide with the surplus-sharing rule, in our context.
11the workers they hire engage in on-the-job search. They are not tempted to stop
t h e mf r o md o i n gs ob yo ﬀering them a higher wage because their search creates
an expected bene￿t, that they enjoy a share of, through the Nash bargaining
wage determination. In other words, as the worker expects to ￿nd a better job,
the value of which more than oﬀsets the search costs, she is better oﬀ searching.
Some of this bene￿t from search (but not all) is taken away from her in the
wage determination as she gets paid a lower wage than she would have, had
she not searched on the job. The ￿rm anticipates having to pay advertising
costs when the worker quits, so would be worse oﬀ if the search decision did
not aﬀect the wage rate. However, because the Nash bargaining leads to a
lower wage when the worker searches on the job, the ￿rm is in fact better oﬀ if
t h ew o r k e rd o e ss e a r c ha st h ew a g ed i ﬀerence more than oﬀsets the anticipated
advertising costs12.F u r t h e r m o r e , ￿rms cannot aﬀord to retain workers who
have an outside oﬀer in hand: as the new job￿s   is unobserved until the worker
actually starts in the new job, the minimum wage that the old ￿rm would have
to pay to retain the worker is a wage that matches the expected wage EV {w}
that the worker anticipates. In fact, in all our simulations, even the ￿rm with
the highest productivity in the range where workers engage in on-the-job search
(  = S)c a n n o ta ﬀord to oﬀer such a wage, i.e. re-opening a vacancy is more
pro￿table than retaining the worker with a wage oﬀer of EV {w}.
12Shimer (2004) argues that surplus sharing may be ineﬃcient as, in some cases, the ￿rm is
better oﬀ raising the wage in order to reduce quitting. This can occur in his model of on-the-
job search where the quitting probability decreases continuously as the wage rate increases.
In our context, however, the quitting probability is either 0 or aθq(θ). The minimum wage
that the ￿rm would have to pay to stop the worker from searching is wn(S).H o w e v e r ,i nt h e
range of productivities (R;S),t h e￿rm is better oﬀ paying wo( ) and let the worker search on
the job. So it will not attempt to discourage the worker to search.
122.3 Equilibrium
Matches between searching workers and vacant jobs occur at a rate determined
by the matching function, which we assume to exhibit constant returns to scale.
The pool of job searchers comprises all the unemployed job seekers, u,p l u st h e
employed workers engaged in on-the-job search, oj,c o u n t e di nt e r m so fe ﬃciency
units:
Number of matches = ξ.(u + a • oj)
(1−α) vα (5)
where ξ is the matching eﬃciency, α the matching elasticity with respect to












The labour force is assumed constant and normalised to 1. The equations
that determine the model equilibrium are the job creation condition (9), the job
destruction condition (10) and the on-the-job search threshold condition (11)
as well as the ￿ow equations for ￿lled jobs and vacant jobs over each range of
idiosyncratic productivities. As in the standard model, vacant jobs are created
until rents are exhausted. What is diﬀerent here is that all vacancies but the




The value of R is less than T because the value of a ￿lled job is positive at
T and the function Jo (.) is increasing. S is the idiosyncratic productivity at
which both workers and ￿rms are indiﬀerent between the worker continuing or
stopping search. The derivation of the model is given in Burgess and Turon
(2004).
2.4 Standard Mortensen-Pissarides Model
The standard M-P model is set out in many places, initially in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), and also in Pissarides (2000). Here we simply highlight the
diﬀerences between it and the model set out above. First, workers are not
a l l o w e dt os e a r c ho nt h ej o bi nt h e i rm o d e l ,s ot h eo n l yc a s ew h e nm a t c h e s
are dissolved is job destruction. Second, in the M-P model, there is an in￿nite
supply of job ￿ideas￿ at the top productivity σ. These are turned into vacancies
until the exhaustion of rents, i.e. until the value of vacancies is zero. In this
setting, vacant jobs are homogeneous and there is no uncertainty about the
idiosyncratic value of a job at the time of the match, as this is necessarily σ.
13In Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), all new jobs were created at the top idiosyncratic
productivity - for which the pro￿ts from a vacancy is zero. Here, jobs are created over a
range of idiosyncratic productivities (T;σ) and the pro￿ts from a vacancy are zero at T and
positive over the rest of the range. In den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2001, pp. 8-10), new
matches are ￿accepted￿ by worker and ￿rm as long as the relationship-speci￿c productivity is
greater than some threshold for which the joint surplus of the match is zero. Blanchard and
Diamond (1989, p.9) already suggested that, in the short run, the pro￿ts from a vacancy were
not necessarily zero.
14From then on, it is subject to idiosyncratic shocks that will aﬀect the value of
the match and lead to wage renegotiation, as in our setting.
The Bellman equations for the MP model are:
rE( )=w( )+l(U − E ( )) + λ
•Z σ
R
E(x)dF(x)+U.F(R) − E ( )
‚
(12)
rU = b + θq(θ) • (E(σ) − U) (13)
rJ ( )=p +   − w( )+l(V − J ( )) + λ
•Z σ
R
J(x)dF(x) − Jn ( )
‚
(14)
rV = −c + q(θ)(J (σ) − V ) (15)
For comparability purposes, we have added exogenous labour force ￿ows to the
standard M-P model. This is in order to keep the same calibrated parameters,
particularly for the value of the arrival rate of idiosyncratic shocks, λ, while
keeping a calibrated unemployment rate that is similar to that simulated by our
model. The equilibrium conditions for this model are the following job creation
and job destruction conditions:
V =0 (16)
J (R)=0 (17)
3R e s u l t s
In this section we ￿rst show that Shimer￿s claim about relative volatility between
aggregate productivity and the vacancy to unemployment ratio (V-U hereafter)
holds true for UK data. We then show with simulations that, although the
standard M-P model cannot mimic the cyclical volatility of the V-U ratio, our
modi￿ed version does. That is, our model leads to a much higher elasticity
15of the V-U ratio with respect to aggregate productivity (12 times greater) and
hence is able to replicate the actual volatility of this ratio. It would be necessary
to assume very high productivity shocks in the M-P framework to match the
empirical volatility of the V-U ratio. To illustrate the impact of each of the two
main diﬀerences between our framework and M-P, we carry out simulations of
our model with heterogenous vacancies but without on-the-job search (Model
I) and of our model with both heterogeneous vacancies and on-the-job search
(Model II) separately.
We take long series on unemployment, vacancies and productivity14.F o l -
lowing Shimer (2005), we construct log(X/XT) where XT is a smoothed series
of X using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter. The standard deviation and maximum
- minimum diﬀerences are reported in the ￿rst two columns of Table 1.T h e
standard deviation of the V-U ratio is about 28 times higher than that for
productivity. For unemployment and for vacancies it is respectively 12a n d19
times higher. Thus the UK also sees much greater volatility of these labour
market magnitudes than productivity. We also estimate the empirical elasticity
of each variable with respect to productivity, since this is what we compare
with the calibrated models. The estimates are reported in column 3 of Ta-




. The regression is set up in error-correction form with 9
lags of ∆log(X/XT)15 and of ∆log
¡
prod0y/prod0yT¢
, and seasonal dummies.
14￿Unemployment￿ is all unemployed claimants, measured on a consistent basis through
various de￿nition changes; ￿vacancies￿ is all job vacancies noti￿ed to Jobcentres; productivity
is real output per ￿lled job. All are quarterly series.
1513 lags were used for unemployment. As we look at the volatility of the various variables
in terms of deviations of their logarithms from trend and as we allow for dynamics in their
time series behaviour, the elasticities in the fourth column do not necessarily add up.
16The V-U ratio has a long-run elasticity of 12.4 with respect to productivity.
Table 1: Empirical and Simulated Features of UK Data
Empirical Volatilities Simulated Elasticities
Std. dev. max - min Elasticity M-P model Model I Model II
Productivity 0.0127 0.0733 -
V/U Ratio 0.3653 1.9889 12.42 1 4.0 12.2
Unemployment 0.1521 0.7209 -22.05 -0.5 -1.6 -4.3
Vacancies 0.2434 1.3355 10.98 0.5 1.9 2.6
Tightness 1 4.0 4.5
U/J ratio 0 0 -3.5
Notes:
1. Series are quarterly and run 1967.1 to 1998.4
2. For each variable X we analyse log(X/XT) where XT is a smoothed series
of X using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter with the recommended smoothing parameter
value of 1600. The descriptive statistics refer to this variable. Tightness and the
U/J ratio are not available empirically, as J is not easily measured.
3. The elasticity is the long-run elasticity of (X/XT) with respect to prod0y/prod0yT.
The elasticity of the V-U ratio with respect to productivity does not equal the
diﬀerence between the vacancy elasticity and the unemployment elasticity for
two reasons. First, the V-U ratio is detrended itself and is not equal to the ratio
of detrended V and detrended U. Second, the elasticity is a long-run coeﬃcient
from a dynamic regression, not a simple coeﬃcient in a bivariate regression.
4. M-P: Mortensen-Pissarides (1994); Model I: our model without on-the-job
s e a r c h ;M o d e lI I :o u rm o d e lw i t ho n - t h e - j o bs e a r c h .
Turning to the simulations, we report in Burgess and Turon (2004) the de-
tails of the calibration, where we set the model parameters to mirror reality
in terms of the stocks and ￿ows in the labour market in the UK. We keep the
same values of the parameters to simulate the three models. We look at the
impact of a change in the aggregate price component p by comparing steady-
states for diﬀerent values of p, embodying once-and-for-all shocks to aggregate
activity16. The resulting changes in the key variables are given in Table A.1 in
the Appendix, and the implied elasticities in the right panel of Table 117.
16This comparative statics exercise is less informative than a dynamic simulation of a sto-
chastic version of the model, as in Pissarides (2000) or Shimer (2005, p.14), but the greater
c o m p l e x i t yo fo u rm o d e lm e a n st h a tt h i si sn o tf e a s i b l e .
17As we calculate the various elasticities as changes in the variables concerned (ηX,Y =
∆X
∆Y • Y
X) rather than diﬀerentations (ηX,Y = ∂X
∂Y • Y










U1 where ηX,Y denotes the elasticity of X with respect to Y .
17As already shown by Shimer (2005), the M-P model predicts an elasticity of
the V-U ratio with respect to productivity18 much smaller than the one observed
in the data (1 in our simulation). However, simulations of our Model I predict
this elasticity to be 4.0. When we allow for employed job search, i.e. in Model II,
the predicted elasticity of the V-U ratio with respect to aggregate productivity
becomes 12.2 and matches its empirical counterpart well.
So both features that distinguish our setup from the standard MP frame-
work, namely our vacancy creation condition and the presence of on-the-job
search, increase the model￿s ability to generate volatility in the V-U ratio. Look-
ing at unemployment and vacancies separately, going from the M-P model to
our model I increases their volatilities by a factor 3 and 4 respectively, while
going from our model I to our model II, i.e. allowing for employed job search,
increases these volatilities by a factor 3 and 1.4 respectively. The elasticities of
unemployment and vacancies with respect to aggregate productivity predicted
by Model II, i.e. -4.3 and 2.6 respectively, are still lower than those observed in
our UK data, i.e. -22 and 11 respectively. However, the volatility of the V-U
ratio in Model II mirrors real facts very well.
Another way of decomposing the V-U ratio is to look at the behaviour of
the V-J ratio (where J is the total number of job seekers), which represents the
labour market tightness, and of the U-J ratio, which represents the fraction of
job seekers who are unemployed. This latter ratio always equals 1 in both the
MP model and our Model I as only unemployed workers are allowed to search.
Consequently, the V-J and V-U ratio coincide in these two models. Simulated
elasticities of the V-J and U-J ratios in the three diﬀerent models are displayed
In our simulations, the last term,
U0
U1 , is substantially away from 1,p a r t i c u l a r l yi nM o d e lI I .
18Shimer (2005) refers more speci￿cally to the elasticity of the V-U ratio with respect to
p−b, i.e. a measure of the replacement ratio. Here, we report results with respect to p as they
are easier to compare with their empirical counterpart. Simulated elasticities with respect to
p − b for the three models however show a similar pattern to that presented here, although
less marked (with a value of 7.4 in Model II).
18in the last two lines of Table 1. Introducing the diﬀerent vacancy creation
condition, (going from the M-P model to Model I), causes a large increase in
the elasticity of the labour market tightness with respect to productivity (from 1
to 4), while further allowing for employed job search has a much smaller impact,
increasing this elasticity from 4 to 4.5. Clearly, the elasticity of the U-J ratio is
unaﬀected by the diﬀerent vacancy creation condition, as in this model J ≡ U.
However, allowing for employed job search in Model II changes the elasticity
of the U-J ratio with respect to productivity to -3.5, contributing substantially
to the volatility of the V-U ratio. So allowing for worker churning strongly
increases the sensitivity of tightness to the cycle; allowing further for on-the-job
search increases that and makes the V-U ratio considerably more volatile than
tightness.
Shimer (2005) argues that the failure of the M-P model to mimic the empir-
ical volatility of the V-U ratio is rooted in the lack of wage rigidity embodied
in this model, which itself comes from the assumption of Nash bargaining wage
determination. While he convincingly makes the point that more wage rigidity
would indeed generate greater volatility in the V-U ratio, our simulations show
that such volatility can also be generated in a framework where wages are de-
termined by Nash bargaining and are as volatile as in the M-P model. Indeed,
both our models in fact predict less wage rigidity than the M-P model. Having
said that, within the context of the model described here, greater on-the-job
search (induced by a lower cost, k) implies greater wage rigidity. The intuition
for this is as follows. As noted above, on-the-job search yields a prospective
bene￿t to the worker that is shared with the ￿rm through a lower wage. In
the boom increased employed job search extends this eﬀect and reduces wages,
partially oﬀsetting the straightforward positive eﬀect of the boom on wages.
194C o n c l u s i o n
There are good reasons for the popularity of the Mortensen-Pissarides model
of the labour market. However, as Shimer (2005) stresses, it fails to replicate
evidence on the cyclical sensitivity of the vacancy-unemployment ratio for the
U S .W es h o wa b o v et h a tt h es a m ea p p l i e st ot h eU K .W ep r o p o s ea ne x t e n s i o no f
their framework in which vacancies are heterogeneous and employed job search
is allowed. This therefore incorporates two well-documented features of labour
markets - worker churning and job-to-job quits. We show in this comment that
adopting these two assumptions is one way of resolving the puzzle highlighted
by Shimer. Furthermore, this can be done within the standard assumptions
on wage setting, and therefore this route oﬀers an alternative to Shimer￿s and
Hall￿s focus on wage determination. Our simulations show that each of our two
assumptions causes a substantial rise in the cyclical volatility of the V-U ratio.
This approach also suggests that we need to interpret the vacancy-unemployment
ratio diﬀerently. With employed job search this ratio does not measure the
tightness of the labour market. It measures the outcome of the joint processes
determining labour market tightness and the composition of job seekers. Includ-
ing this in the modelling approach is one promising way of reconciling theory
and evidence.
20Appendix
Table A.1: Cyclical volatility of key variables in the three models
Model I Model II MP model
Base Boom Base Boom Base Boom
Market tightness θ 0.36 0.50 0.47 0.68 1.83 2.01
Unemp. job seekers u 0.147 0.124 0.088 0.050 0.149 0.141
Un. out￿ow rate θq(θ) 0.36 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.81 0.85
Emp. job seekers oj 0 0 0.063 0.070 0 0
Vacancies v 0.052 0.062 0.092 0.116 0.272 0.285
V/U ratio 0.36 0.50 1.05 2.32 1.83 2.01
U/J ratio 11 0.45 0.29 11
Note: A higher value of p by 10% simulates a boom.
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